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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
the period of June 1, 2010 through May 31, 2011 that pertain to Georgia
fiduciary law and estate planning.'
I.

A.

GEORGIA CASES

What Constitutes a Will

The question in Swain v. Lee 2 was whether the documents at issue
could possibly constitute a valid will.3 The testator, Ms. Collins, wrote
a letter in 1999 "in which she stated ... that Swain was to have
'everything that's in my name."' The letter was not witnessed. In
2005, Collins took a blank will form and wrote in language that named
Swain as the executor of her estate. She wrote nothing else on this
form. Collins signed the form, and it was witnessed by three witnesses.
Collins kept both of these documents together in an envelope and

* Marjorie Fine Knowles Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Newcomb College of Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981).
Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee,
Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia.
President, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. Author, MARY F. RADFORD,
GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA (2005); MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN:
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (7th ed. 2008); MARY F. RADFORD ET AL., THE LAW

OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 975-1030 (2006 & Supp. 2007). The Author wishes to thank
Clarissa Bryan for her research assistance.
1. For an analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 62 MERCER L. REV. 365 (2010).
2. 287 Ga. 825, 700 S.E.2d 541 (2010).
3. Id. at 825-26, 700 S.E.2d at 542.
4. Id. at 826, 700 S.E.2d at 542.
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showed both documents to the witnesses when she signed the form. 5
When Collins died, Swain attempted to probate the two documents as
Collins's will. The temporary administrator of her estate filed a caveat.
The Probate Court of Glynn County, Georgia, found that the documents
did not constitute a valid will, so Swain appealed to the Superior Court
of Glynn County, Georgia. The administrator filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which was granted.' The Georgia Supreme
Court reversed the order and remanded the case for trial, holding that
an issue of fact existed as to whether the documents could be read
together to create a valid will.' The supreme court emphasized that the
intention of the maker, gathered from the whole instrument and the
surrounding circumstances, is determinative.' The court noted that
there is no required form for a will; nor must a will be written on one
continuous sheet of paper or on sheets that are attached together.' The
court pointed out that Swain argued the letter and the will form were
presented to the witnesses as an integrated document.o This alone
created an issue of fact as to the validity of the will."
B.

ProperExecution of a Will
In Auito v. Auito,12 the testator's will included a self-proving affidavit
that complied substantially with the statutory form.13 In the body of
the affidavit, the lines that were meant to contain the witnesses' names
were blank. However, the witnesses did sign the affidavit on the
appropriate signature lines. The caveator's only ground for attack of the
will was that the self-proving affidavit was improper." The supreme
court agreed with the probate court that the self-proving affidavit was
adequate." The court noted that the three essential elements of a
complete affidavit were met: "(a) a written oath . . ; (b) the signature of

5. Id. at 826, 700 S.E.2d at 542-43.
6. Id. at 825-26, 700 S.E.2d at 542.
7. Id. at 827-28, 700 S.E.2d at 543.
8. Id. at 827, 700 S.E.2d at 543; see also O.C.G.A. § 53-4-3 (2011).
9. Swain, 287 Ga. at 827, 700 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146,
147 (1879)).
10. Id. at 826, 700 S.E.2d at 542-43.
11. Id. at 827, 700 S.E.2d at 543.
12. 288 Ga. 443, 704 S.E.2d 789 (2011).
13. Id. at 443, 704 S.E.2d at 789-90. This form appears at O.C.G.A. § 53-4-24(b) (2011).
A will that is self-proved may be probated without the testimony of the witnesses.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-24(a) (2011). See also MARY F. RADFORD, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN
GEORGIA § 5:8 (7th ed. 2008).
14. Auito, 288 Ga. at 444, 704 S.E.2d at 790.
15. Id. at 444, 704 S.E.2d at 790-91.
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the affiant; and (c) the attestation by an officer authorized to administer
the oath that the affidavit was actually sworn by the affiant before the
officer."" The court held that identification by name of the witnesses
in the body of the affidavit is not essential."

C.

Testamentary Capacity, Undue Influence, Ademption
The most recent opinion in Melican v. Parker (Melican 111)18 marks

the third time the Georgia Supreme Court has issued an opinion relating
to the final disposition of the estate of Mr. Harvey Strother. The 2008
case (Melican I) dealt primarily with standing to caveat the will.20
The 2009 case (Melican II)21 addressed and found invalid the first and
third codicils of Strother's will. 22 In Melican III, the court upheld the
second codicil.
In the ten years prior to his death the testator Harvey Strother, a
married man, executed three codicils to his will that favored his lover,
Anne Melican, and her son.2 ' These three codicils left a significant
amount of money and property to Melican and her son. The first codicil
left Melican a $7900 monthly payment for life. The second codicil gave
her a Florida condominium, provided the testator still owned it at his
death. The third codicil-executed within weeks of Strother's deathdirected the payoff of a mortgage on a Cape Cod home shared by Melican
and Strother and gave Melican's son the Florida property on which his
business was located. 2 '
The record establishes that "[t]he will named Sydney Parker as
executor and as trustee of a testamentary trust created for [the]
Testator's wife."26 Acting in both capacities, Parker filed caveats to the
codicils, in which he was joined by a grandson of the testator. The
caveators claimed lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence."
In Melican I, the Georgia Supreme Court granted an interlocutory
review of both the probate court's denial of the propounders' motion to

16. Id. at 443, 704 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting Roberson v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 250 Ga. App.
350, 352, 553 S.E.2d 162, 165 (2001)).
17. Id. at 444, 704 S.E.2d at 790.
18. 289 Ga. 420, 711 S.E.2d 628 (2011).
19. Melican v. Parker, 283 Ga. 253, 657 S.E.2d 234 (2008).
20. Id. at 254-57, 657 S.E.2d at 236-38.
21. Parker v. Melican, 286 Ga. 185, 684 S.E.2d 654 (2009).
22. Id. at 185, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
23. See Melican III, 289 Ga. 421, 711 S.E.2d at 629-30.
24. Melican I, 283 Ga. at 253, 657 S.E.2d at 235.
25. Melican II, 286 Ga. at 185, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
26. Melican 1, 283 Ga. at 253, 657 S.E.2d at 235.
27. Id. at 253, 657 S.E.2d at 235-36.
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have the caveat dismissed and the denial of the motion for summary
judgment.2 8
First, the supreme court examined whether Parker, in his capacities
as executor and testamentary trustee, had standing to file a caveat.2 9
The supreme court noted that there has been a "healthy trend" to
expand the category of interested persons who have standing to caveat
a will.30 The court examined decisions from other jurisdictions.3 ' The
court did not resolve whether Parker as executor had standing to file a
caveat, but it did conclude that Parker, as testamentary trustee, had a
substantial interest in the estate.
The court distinguished this case from those in which a later codicil
may affect the trustee by shifting control of the corpus or the payment
of the fees from the trustee to someone else." In such a case, the
trustee would not have standing." However, in the instant case the
codicil changed the beneficiaries of the estate and caused an adverse
effect on what the beneficiary of the trust would receive. Thus, the
court held that the probate court correctly denied the motion to dismiss
the caveat for lack of standing.36
Second, on the question of testamentary capacity, the caveators offered
evidence of the testator's extensive alcohol abuse and dependency. The
testator usually drank up to one and a half gallons of wine per day,
causing his blood alcohol level to be near 0.40 grams. 37 The caveators
showed that he had been heavily intoxicated on the day after he signed
the second codicil and earlier in the month when he signed the third
codicil." Other evidence showed that in the last months of his life, the
testator suffered memory loss and was unable to make business
decisions."
The supreme court held that the denial of the motion for summary
judgment was improper as to the testator's testamentary capacity
because there remained a genuine issue of material fact when the

28. Id. at 253, 657 S.E.2d at 236.
29. Id. at 254-55, 657 S.E.2d at 236-37.
30. Id. at 254, 657 S.E.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Haddock, 140 So. 2d 631, 636 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 149 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1963)).
31. See id. at 255, 657 S.E.2d at 236.
32. Id. at 255, 657 S.E.2d at 236-37.
33. Id. at 256, 657 S.E.2d at 237.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 257, 657 S.E.2d at 238.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 257-58, 657 S.E.2d at 238.
39. Id. at 258, 657 S.E.2d at 238-39.
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evidence was construed most favorably for the caveators.40 The court
also determined that the denial of the propounders' motion for summary
judgment on the undue influence issue was proper." The evidence
showed that the seventy-nine-year-old testator was dependent on alcohol
and suffered from numerous physical ailments.42 When he signed the
second and third codicils, he was "in an incapacitated state, vulnerable,
and easily manipulated." When he stayed in Florida, he was entirely
Melican took the testator to her own
dependent upon Melican."
attorney, and she and her son sat in the office on either side of the
testator when he signed the third codicil." The court held that a
genuine issue of material fact remained on the undue influence issue
and remanded the case.
The case was tried in 2008 in the Probate Court of Cobb County,
Georgia.47 The jury found in favor of Melican on the first two codicils
but found that the third codicil was invalid and both parties appealed.
In October 2009, the supreme court held in Melican II that the first
codicil was invalid because it was not properly executed-thereby
reversing the jury's finding in favor of the validity of the first codicil-and
affirmed the jury verdict that the third codicil was invalid.49 The court
did not rule on the second codicil because it determined that the
caveator's challenge with regard to the property listed in that codicil had
not been ruled on by the trial court.o
1. First and Third Codicils (Melican II). The two witnesses to
the first codicil were healthcare workers who worked full-time for the
testator beginning in September 2000.1 The first codicil was dated
July 20, 2000.52 The first witness claimed that Strother asked her to
sign a document, but he did not explain to her what it was. She testified
that his signature was not on the document when she signed it. The
second witness testified to the same facts, although there was conflicting

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 258, 657 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 258, 657 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 258, 657 S.E.2d at 238.
Id.
Id. at 258, 657 S.E.2d at 239.
Id.
Id.
Melican III, 289 Ga. at 420 n.2, 711 S.E.2d at 629 n.2.
Melican II, 286 Ga. at 185, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185-86, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 186 n.1, 684 S.E.2d at 657 n.1.
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testimony in her earlier deposition.sa The supreme court noted that
section 53-4-20(b) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)r 4
requires a testator sign or acknowledge the signature on his or her will
in the presence of two witnesses." The supreme court stated the
evidence showed that "it is clear [the] testator failed to sign or acknowledge his signature on the first codicil in the presence of at least one, and
possibly both, subscribing witnesses."" The propounders of the will
alleged that, since the witnesses' memories as to the circumstances
surrounding their attestation were unclear, they should be treated as
"unavailable" for testifying, thereby authorizing the jury to consider
other testimony as to the validity of the codicil." O.C.G.A. § 53-5-24 5
allows the consideration of other credible, disinterested persons'
testimony if "one or more of the subscribing witnesses to the will is dead
or mentally or physically incapable of testifying or otherwise inaccessible."" The court refused to entertain this argument and found that the
testimony of at least one of the witnesses was "unequivocal."o The
court also refused to consider a clause in the codicil stating that the
codicil was signed on the specified date as an attestation clause because
the clause did not mention whether the testator signed or acknowledged
his signature in the presence of the witnesses." The court went on to
point out that an attestation clause only provides a presumption of due
execution, and such a presumption was "rebutted by clear proof that the
codicil was not properly executed."'
The propounders' appeal of the jury verdict against the third codicil
was based on the argument that the trial court improperly charged the
jury with instructions that the caveators did not have the burden of
proving the grounds of their caveat.6 3 The supreme court pointed out
that the propounders of a will have the burden of proving all elements
of its validity, including the testamentary capacity of the testator and
the free and voluntary execution of the will.6 4 At trial, the caveators
merely denied the propounders' assertions that Strother had the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 186, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20(b) (2011).
Melican II, 286 Ga. at 185, 684 S.E.2d at 656; see also O.C.G.A.
Melican II, 286 Ga. at 186, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 53-5-24 (2011).
Id.
Melican II, 286 Ga. at 186, 684 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 186, 684 S.E.2d at 656-57.
Id. at 186, 684 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 187, 684 S.E.2d at 657.
Id.

§ 53-4-20(b).
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appropriate capacity and that the will was not the product of undue
influence." According to the court, since the caveators raised no
affirmative defense, they did not assume the burden of proof and were
merely required to rebut the propounders' prima facie case.
2. Second Codicil (Melican III). The second codicil to Strother's
will dealt with a condominium located in Florida, so the Georgia
Supreme Court applied Florida law.6 7 The second codicil stated: "If I
am still the owner of the Cozumel Condominium, Unit # 806, located in
Marco Island, Florida at the time of my death, not withstanding any
provision in my [will to the contrary, that property shall pass to Anne
Melican."' Strother entered into a contract to sell the condominium
before he died, but the closing did not occur until after his death. The
executor claimed that the property had been adeemed and that Melican
Under the
was not entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale.
traditional ademption rule, if property that is devised in a will is not
owned by the testator at death for any reason, the beneficiary to whom
the property was devised receives no substitute for the property. 70
Melican claimed that Florida's "nonademption statute," section 732.606
of the Florida Statutes, 1 applied. This statute provides, in pertinent
part, that "[a] specific devisee has the right to the remaining specifically
devised property and . .. [any balance of the purchase price owing from
a purchaser to the testator at death because of sale of the property
. . . ."0 This statute, according to the Georgia Supreme Court, overrode
any previous Florida case law relating to the sale of a house prior to a
decedent's death. 74 This case brings into play a doctrine accepted in
both Georgia and Florida that is referred to as "equitable conversion." 5
The equitable conversion doctrine, as defined in the Florida case of In re
Estate of Sweet v. First National Bank of Clearwater, provides as
follows:
76

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Melican III, 289 Ga. at 421, 711 S.E.2d at 629.
Id. at 426, 711 S.E.2d at 632 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420-21, 711 S.E.2d at 629 (majority opinion).
70. See RADFORD, supra note 13, § 8:4.
71. FLA. STAT. § 732.606 (2011), availableat http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/.
72. Melican 111, 289 Ga. at 421, 711 S.E.2d 629-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73.
74.

FLA. STAT. § 732.606(aX2).
Melican III, 289 Ga. at 422, 711 S.E.2d at 630.

75. See id.
76.

254 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

392

[Vol. 63

[Wihen an owner makes a specifically enforceable contract to sell his
real property, the vendee becomes the beneficial owner and the vendor
retains only naked legal title in trust for the vendee and as security for
the vendee's performance . .

.

.

Under this doctrine the vendor's

interest is considered personalty and passes accordingly upon the
vendor's death . ...

Under this theory, when the contract between Strother and the
purchaser was signed, Strother no longer owned the property.

However, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that the Florida statute
prevailed; thus, Melican, under the statute, was entitled to receive any

"balance of the purchase price" owed to Strother." As none of the
purchase price in this case had been paid at the time of Strother's death,
Melican was entitled to the entire proceeds."o The Georgia court cited
Florida case law that stated-in a somewhat different context-that the
Florida nonademption statute would control."
In the dissent, Justice Carley, joined by Justices Benham and
Thompson, approached this case as a matter of fulfilling the clear
intention of the testator, rather than as a matter that would be
controlled by the nonademption statute." Justice Carley pointed out
that a statute appearing at the beginning of the chapter in which the
Florida nonademption statute appears provides that "[tihe intention of
the testator as expressed in the will controls the legal effect of the
testator's dispositions. The rules of construction[, including § 732.6061
... shall apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will."83
Justice Carley noted a clear contrary intention apparent in the testator's
words "[ilf I am still the owner. . . ."' The devise created a "conditional specific devise," the condition of which had not been met.85
Justice Carley argued that the relevance of the equitable conversion
doctrine was two-fold: first, the application of the doctrine caused
Strother to no longer be the owner of the condominium; second, the
application of the doctrine of equitable conversion would have caused
Strother's interest in the condominium to be converted into personal

77. Id. at 563.
78. Melican III, 289 Ga. at 421, 711 S.E.2d at 630.
79. Id. at 421, 711 S.E.2d at 629-30; FLA. STAT. § 732.606(a)(2).
80. Melican III, 289 Ga. at 421, 711 S.E.2d at 630.
81. Id. at 421-22, 711 S.E.2d at 629-30.
82. Id. at 425, 711 S.E.2d at 632 (Carley, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 427, 711 S.E.2d at 633 (alterations in original); FLA. STAT.
(2011), availableat http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/.
84. Melican III, 289 Ga. at 426, 711 S.E.2d at 632.
85. Id.

§ 733.6005(1)
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property when he signed the contract.8 ' Thus, the dissent argued that
Georgia law rather than Florida law should apply.87
The Georgia Probate Code' also contains a nonademption statute
that is not as broad as the Florida statute." O.C.G.A. § 53-4-679o
does not apply to the situation in which property that is the subject of
a specific bequest is sold." Rather, the statute applies to circumstances that are beyond the control of the testator.92 Under the Georgia
statute, if property is stolen, lost, destroyed, or condemned within six
months of the decedent's death, the beneficiary of the specific testamentary gift is entitled to the insurance or condemnation proceeds."
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-55, the first statute in the article that covers the
construction of wills, directs the court to seek diligently the intent of the
testator and to give effect to that intention.95
D. Trustee's Discretion
McPherson v. McPherson6 is the first trust case decided by a Georgia
appellate court since the enactment of the Revised Georgia Trust Code
of 2010 (the Revised Trust Code).97 Although the Georgia Court of
Appeals referenced the Revised Trust Code in its opinion, it ultimately
determined that only a few of its provisions applied in this case."8
Howard McPherson set up an irrevocable trust in 1990, at which time
he had four children.99 The trust gave the trustee discretion to pay out
the income and principal of the trust in "equal or unequal" amounts to
Howard's children, "as may be needed for their support [and] maintenance ... taking into consideration any other means of support they or
any of them may have to the knowledge of the Trustee."' Howard
reserved the right to remove a trustee "for reasonable cause" and replace

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 427-28, 711 S.E.2d at 633-34.
Id. at 428, 711 S.E.2d at 634.
O.C.G.A. tit. 53, chs. 1-11 (2011).
See RADFORD, supra note 13, § 8:4.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-67 (2011).
See id.
See id.
Id. § 53-4-67(b).
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-55 (2011).
Id.
307 Ga. App. 548, 705 S.E.2d 314 (2011).
Ga. S. Bill 131, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 506 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12

(2011)).

98. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 550-51, 705 S.E.2d at 317-18.
99. Id. at 548, 705 S.E.2d at 316.
100.

Id.
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that trustee with anyone but himself.'o In 1992, the four McPherson
children served as trustees of the trust. The trustees distributed trust
property in equal shares among the children from 1992 to 2005. In
2004, Howard told one son, Eric, that he was considering removing him
as trustee for a number of reasons: Eric refused to sign certain
documents, he put his girlfriend on the company payroll, and he
threatened to sue his siblings. When Eric in fact sued his siblings a few
months later, in March of 2005, Howard removed Eric as a trustee. 0 2
In July 2005, the trustees decided to distribute $300,000 to each of the
McPherson children. However, Eric's share was reduced to $250,000
after he submitted a false affidavit in an attempt to have his child
support payments reduced; the remaining $50,000 was placed in a
subtrust for his children. The trustees also decided to deduct from his
share $157,000 to cover the expenses of defending the lawsuit. Over the
next three years, the children received $2,240,000 each from the trust.
Eric sued again in 2006, this time claiming that the trustees had abused
their discretion and fiduciary duties by withholding the $157,000 and by
not taking into account the children's other resources. He also sought
an injunction against his father for removing him as co-trustee.o The
trustees sought and received summary judgment in their favor, and the
court of appeals affirmed. 10 4
The court of appeals cited the Revised Trust Code, common law, and
the Second and Third Restatements of Trusts' in its opinion. 0 6
The court noted that the Revised Trust Code does not require the trustee
to consider other resources a beneficiary may have before distribution,'07 but that Howard included that direction in his trust.108 The
court also noted that the Revised Trust Code requires a trustee to
exercise discretionary powers "in good faith."o' The court held that

101.

Id. at 548-49, 705 S.E.2d at 316.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 549, 705 S.E.2d at 316.
Id. at 549, 705 S.E.2d at 316-17.
Id. at 549-50, 553, 705 S.E.2d at 317, 319.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

(1987).

106. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 551, 705 S.E.2d at 318.
107. Id. at 550, 705 S.E.2d at 317; see O.C.G.A. § 53-12-245 (2011).
108. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 550, 705 S.E.2d at 317. Under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-7,
the settlor of a trust is allowed to vary any of the terms of the Revised Trust Code, except
those listed in that Code section. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-7 (2011). O.C.G.A. § 53-12-245 does not
appear on this list. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-7.
109. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 550, 705 S.E.2d at 317 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see O.C.G.A. § 53-12-260 (2011). This requirement appears on the list in O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-7(a)(4) and, thus, may not be varied by the settlor. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-7.

2011]1

395

WILLS & TRUSTS

judicial intervention was not appropriate absent a finding of bad
faith.no The court cited the Third Restatement of Trusts for the
concept that a court may intervene only when trustees abuse their
discretionary powers."' The court also pointed out that the Restatement's commentary advises that when there are multiple beneficiaries,
a per stirpes distribution"'2 is the presumed form of distribution."'
The court stated that Eric did not prove whether the trustees failed to
take the beneficiaries' other resources into account, but even if they had
failed to do so, the trust instrument allowed them to make distributions
in unequal amounts."' The court also articulated the "cardinal rule"
that the settlor's intent should control."' As to the reduction of Eric's
share to pay for the costs of litigation, the court noted that Eric's first
suit was unsuccessful and that the reduction was made on a "principled
basis.""' Finally, the court determined that Eric's actions constituted
"reasonable cause" for his removal." 7
Guardiansof Minors
Two cases decided during the reporting period confirm that parents
have virtually unquestioned power to choose who will serve as guardians
of their minor children. The case of Zinkhan v. Bruce"8 began with
the tragic incident of a college professor who shot and killed his wife and
then killed himself. The couple had two minor children. In their wills,
both nominated the husband's brother, Zinkhan, as the children's
Immediately after the wife's death and
testamentary guardian.'

E.

110. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 318-19.
111.

Id. at 551, 705 S.E.2d at 318; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§

50.

112. For a discussion of the meaning of the term "per stirpes," see RADFORD, supra note
13, § 9:2.
113.

McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 318; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TRUSTs § 50 cmt. f.
114. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 318.
115. Id. (quoting Griffith v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 249 Ga. 143, 146,287 S.E.2d
526, 529 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116.

Id. at 553, 705 S.E.2d at 319; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 50

cmt.

f.
117. McPherson, 307 Ga. App. at 553, 705 S.E.2d at 319. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-221 allows
a trustee to be removed in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument or for
good cause. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-221 (2011).
118. 305 Ga. App. 510, 699 S.E.2d 833 (2010).
119. Id. at 510, 699 S.E.2d at 834. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4 allows a parent to nominate in
the parent's will who will serve as testamentary guardian for the parent's minor children
when the parent dies. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(a) (2007). O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(b) requires the
probate judge to issue letters of guardianship to the nominee "without notice or hearing
provided that the individual is willing to serve." O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(b) (2007). See also
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before the husband was found, the wife's brother and sister-in-law (the
Bruces) filed a petition for temporary guardianship of the children in
McDuffie County, where the Bruces resided. The temporary guardianship was granted.12 0 After the husband's body was found, Zinkhan
filed to probate his brother's will in common form and for letters of
testamentary guardianship over the children. Zinkhan filed in AthensClarke County, where the parents resided.121
The Athens-Clarke County Probate Judge admitted the will to probate
but, at that point, declined to terminate the temporary guardianship by
issuing letters of testamentary guardianship to Zinkhan."' The
Bruces filed petitions for permanent guardianship and conservatorship
in McDuffie County; however, the McDuffie County Probate Court
transferred the petitions to the Athens-Clarke County Probate Court.
The Athens-Clarke County Probate Judge set a date for trial. On the
trial date, the Bruces objected to the appointment of Zinkhan and
requested an evidentiary hearing so that the best interests of the
children could be determined. Both the Bruces and Zinkhan filed
petitions to have the will admitted to probate in solemn form. The
Athens-Clarke County Probate Judge granted Zinkhan's petition and,
without a hearing, issued letters of testamentary guardianship to
him. 123
A few months later, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),124 the Bruces filed a petition for
Zinkhan's motion to dismiss the petition
custody of the children."'
for lack of jurisdiction was denied. The McDuffie County Superior Court
granted joint legal custody of the children to Zinkhan and the Bruces
and temporary physical custody to the Bruces. Zinkhan appealed the
custody order and the Bruces appealed the testamentary guardianship
order. In particular, the Bruces stated that the probate court had

F. RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA § 2-3 (1st ed. 2005).
120. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 511, 699 S.E.2d at 835. The probate court may appoint
a temporary guardian for a child upon the petition of the child's parent or other person who
has custody of the minor. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-5(a) (2007). The temporary guardian will serve
while the parent is unavailable or unwilling to perform parental duties. See RADFORD,
supra note 119, § 2-4.
121. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 511, 699 S.E.2d at 834-35.
122. Id. at 511, 699 S.E.2d at 835.
123. Id. at 511-12, 699 S.E.2d at 835.
124. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -104 (2010).
125. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 512, 699 S.E.2d at 835. The official report of this case
indicates that the Bruces filed in Athens-Clarke County, but the custody order was issued
by the McDuffie County Superior Court. See id.
MARY
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neglected to consider whether the appointment of Zinkhan as the
children's guardian was in the children's best interests. 1 26
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of the letters of testamentary
guardianship and reversed the custody order because the superior court
lacked jurisdiction. 12 7 The court of appeals agreed with Zinkhan that
probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to grant letters of testamentary guardianship.12 8 Under the Georgia Guardianship Code,12 ' as
testamentary guardian Zinkhan had the exclusive power to take custody
of the children and provide for their "support, care, education, health,
and welfare . . . ."1' The court dismissed the Bruces' contention that
the McDuffie County Court somehow had jurisdiction of the children
under the UCCJEA, as that statute applies only to interstate custody
disputes."a' The court also noted that a court's custody jurisdiction
under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1132 applies only to cases "between a parent and
specified relatives. . . ."'" The court further noted that the Bruces had

an appropriate legal remedy in probate court; thus, it would be improper
for the superior court to intervene in the name of "equity."' 34 The
court of appeals determined that the Athens-Clarke County Probate
Court acted in accordance with the Georgia Guardianship Code when it
issued letters of testamentary guardianship to Zinkhan without notice
The court noted that O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(a)'3a was inor hearing.1'3
tended to promote the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the
rights of parents to "raise their children without undue state interference." 37 This statute reflects the rights of parents to determine who
will be their children's guardian in their absence or after their
deaths. 138

126. Id. at 510-11, 699 S.E.2d at 834.
127. Id. at 511, 699 S.E.2d at 834.
128. Id. at 513, 699 S.E.2d at 835; see also O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30(aX2), (5) (2011).
129. O.C.G.A. tit. 29, ch. 2 (2007 & Supp. 2011).
130. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 513, 699 S.E.2d at 836 (emphasis omitted); see also
O.C.G.A. § 29-2-22(a)(5) (Supp. 2011).
131. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 836.
132. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (2010).
133. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 836.
134. Id. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 836-37.
135. Id. at 516, 699 S.E.2d at 837.
136. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-4(a) (2007).
137. Zinkhan, 305 Ga. App. at 515, 699 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting Brooks v. Parkerson,
265 Ga. 189, 191, 454 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1995)).
138. See id. at 515-16, 699 S.E.2d at 837.
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involved a temporary guardianship 4 0 rather

than a permanent testamentary guardianship.'4 1 In this case, a nonparent petitioned for temporary guardianship of a minor and the minor's
mother consented to the petition. Two years later the mother sought to
terminate the temporary guardianship, and the temporary guardian
objected.14 2 The records were transferred by the probate court to the
juvenile court to determine whether the continuation of the guardianship
would be in the best interest of the minor.'4 3 The juvenile court "found
by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child
44
The
[would] be served by continuing the temporary guardianship."
mother challenged the "best interest" standard claiming it was an
unconstitutional violation of her fundamental "right to raise her child"
as she sees fit.' 4 ' The mother contended that the best interest standard should be construed narrowly to require a finding that termination
of the guardianship would cause harm to the child.'4 6 The mother
based her argument on a case that construed the best interest standard
narrowly in a custody hearing.'47
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed and determined that a dispute
between a parent and a non-parent for custody of a child was substantially similar to a dispute over temporary guardianship because the
termination of the guardianship would vest custody and control over the
The court concluded that in such cases the state
child in the parent.'
should not be allowed to interfere with the parent's right absent a
finding that such interference is in the child's best interest and the
parent's decision would result in harm to the child.14 9 Accordingly, the
court held that O.C.G.A. § 29-2-815o requires the third party to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer physical or
The court
emotional harm if the guardianship is terminated.'"'

139. 288 Ga. 143, 702 S.E.2d 172 (2010).
140. See RADFORD, supra note 119, § 2-4, for a description of temporary guardianships.
141. Boddie, 288 Ga. at 143, 702 S.E.2d at 173.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 143, 702 S.E.2d at 173-74; see also O.C.G.A. § 29-2-8(b) (2007).
144. Boddie, 288 Ga. at 143-44, 702 S.E.2d at 174.
145. Id. at 144, 702 S.E.2d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 588, 544 S.E.2d 99, 101 (2001) (holding
best-interest standard should be construed narrowly and requiring a third party to show
parental custody would harm the child)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 146, 702 S.E.2d at 175.
150. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-8 (2007).
151. Boddie, 288 Ga. at 146, 702 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587,
598, 544 S.E.2d 99, 107 (2001)).
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reversed the juvenile court's holding because in this case the lower court
used only a preponderance of the evidence standard and made no finding
that termination of the guardianship would harm the child.- 2

F

Beneficiary Designations in Retirement Plans
In Alcorn v. Appleton,'13 the executor of Mr. Alcorn's estate, his

daughter, and the executor's sister brought suit against their father's
second wife, claiming that she should return assets she received under
their father's 401(k) and life insurance plans. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the wife. 54 The court of appeals
reversed.'
The Alcorns entered into a separate maintenance agreement prior to Mr. Alcorn's death."' Pursuant to that agreement, both
waived any rights they had to receive "any retirement pay, benefits, or
privileges earned by the other during the marriage.""' When Mr.
Alcorn died, it was discovered that he had not designated a beneficiary
for his 401(k) plan and had named his wife as the beneficiary of his
employer-sponsored life insurance plan. The sisters did not dispute that
the plan administrator appropriately paid the proceeds under both plans
to Mr. Alcorn's wife, but instead they sued her directly for breach of
contract and breach of the settlement agreement. The wife filed a
motion to dismiss, which was granted.'
The trial court relied on a United States Supreme Court case, Kennedy
v. Plan Administrator,"'in which an estate sued a plan administrator
for distributing plan proceeds to an ex-wife who waived her rights to
those benefits in a court decree.6 o In a footnote in Alcorn, the court
of appeals quoted the Supreme Court opinion in Kennedy where the
Court stated it "did not 'express any view as to whether the [elstate
could have brought an action in state or federal court against [decedent's
ex-wife] to obtain the benefits after they were distributed.""6 1 On
appeal, the sisters asserted that their case was exactly the type of case
on which the Court in Kennedy declined to rule.'62 The sisters cited

152. Id. at 143-44, 147, 702 S.E.2d at 174, 176.
153. 308 Ga. App. 663, 708 S.E.2d 390 (2011).
154. Id. at 663, 708 S.E.2d at 390.
155. Id. at 663, 708 S.E.2d at 391.
156. Id. at 663, 708 S.E.2d at 390.
157. Id. at 664, 708 S.E.2d at 391.

158.
159.

Id.
555 U.S. 285 (2009).

160. Id. at 869.
161. Alcorn, 308 Ga. App. at 665 n.1, 708 S.E.2d at 392 n.1 (alteration in original)
(quoting Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300 n.10).
162. Id. at 665, 708 S.E.2d at 392.
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cases from other jurisdictions that persuaded the court of appeals to
reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and allow the case to
proceed."'3
II.

GEORGIA LEGISLATION

The Revised Georgia Trust Code of 20101" became effective on July
1, 2010.165 In 2011, the legislature adopted amendments to the code
that were designed primarily to correct typographical and other errors
in the 2010 code and to make a few necessary substantive changes.16 1
The major substantive changes are discussed briefly in this section.
A.

Who Has the Rights of a Qualified Beneficiary

O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(10)167 describes certain trust beneficiaries as
These beneficiaries have certain en"qualified beneficiar[ies]."'"
hanced rights to notice that are not shared by more remote or contingent
The 2011 amendment to the definition of qualified
beneficiaries."
beneficiary expands the definition by providing that certain other
persons are treated as qualified beneficiaries even though they are not
in fact "beneficiaries" of the trust."'o The first of these two additional
qualified beneficiaries is the Attorney General of the State of Georgia."7 ' Often charitable trusts do not have specific beneficiaries, as
they are established for the good of the public at large. O.C.G.A. § 5312-174172 states that the attorney general has the authority to represent the interest of the charitable beneficiaries."17 Thus, it is appropriate that the attorney general should be given the same rights relating
to notice and consent as qualified beneficiaries. The second additional
qualified beneficiary is a person who has been appointed to enforce a
trust that has been set up for the care of an animal.17 4 Because the

163. Id.
164. O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12 (2011).
165. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-364(c) (2011).
166. Ga. S. Bill 134, §§ 6-14, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tit. 53, ch. 12).
167. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(10) (2011); see also Radford, supra note 1, at 378 n.120.
168. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(10).
169. See, e.g., id. §§ 53-12-210, -242 (2011).
170. See id. § 53-12-2(10).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 53-12-174 (2011).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 53-12-2(10). O.C.G.A. § 53-12-28(a) (2011) allows a settlor to set up a trust
for the care of an animal. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-28(b) (2011) allows the settlor or the court to
appoint a person to enforce the trust.
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animal beneficiary cannot receive notice or give consent, the appointee
is the appropriate person to take on this role.175
B.

Parent May Represent Child Who Is a Beneficiary
Minor children and even unborn children may be beneficiaries of
trusts. For example, a grandmother might set up a trust to benefit her
living children for their lives and then direct the trust assets to be
divided among her grandchildren. The children or grandchildren of the
grandmother may be minors and, in some cases, the grandchildren may
not yet be born. There are many provisions in the code that require
either notice to or the consent of beneficiaries."' In situations in
which a beneficiary is not sui juris,"' the code allows a guardian"'
or conservator179 who has been appointed for the non sui juris beneficiary to act for that beneficiary.so If no guardian or conservator has
been appointed, newly-added O.C.G.A. § 53-12-8181 allows parents to
"represent" or act for their minor or unborn child, provided there is no
conflict of interest between the parent and the child.'82 This eliminates the need for the court to appoint a guardian ad litem, guardian,
or conservator for the sole purpose of receiving notice or giving consent
on behalf of most minors or unborn beneficiaries.
C.

Agent Creating Trust for IncapacitatedPrincipal

O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20(a)' allows an agent by power of attorney to
create a trust for the principal, but only if the instrument appointing the
agent contains express authorization for the agent to do so." There
is one group of trusts for which this requirement was found to be more
175. Id. § 53-12-2(10).
176. See, e.g., id. §§ 53-12-210, -242.
177. "Sui juris" is defined as "of full age and capacity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572
(9th ed. 2009).
178. A "guardian" is the individual who takes care of a minor's or incapacitated adult's
personal affairs. See generally O.C.G.A. tit. 29, ch. 2, 4 (2007 & Supp. 2011). Parents
whose parental rights have not been terminated are deemed to be the "natural guardians"
of their children. RADFORD, supra note 119, § 2-2.
179. A "conservator" is the person who handles the financial affairs of a minor or
incapacitated adult. See generally O.C.G.A. tit. 29, ch. 3, 5 (2007 & Supp. 2011). Parents
are not automatically the conservators of their children. RADFORD, supra note 119, § 3-1.
Rather, if the child's assets are greater than $15,000, a parent must be appointed by the
court as conservator in order to manage the child's assets. Id.
180. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 53-12-210, -242.
181. Id. § 53-12-8 (2011).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 53-12-20(a) (2011).
184. Id.
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harmful than helpful; thus, the 2011 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 53-1220185 excepted these trusts from the requirement that the power of
attorney contain an express authorization.1 6 The type of trust at
issue is a trust where the beneficiary requires nursing home care that
is funded solely with the beneficiary's income, including income from
Social Security and other retirement sources, and that will pay back to
the state at the beneficiary's death all unexpended funds in the trust up
to the value of the total medical assistance provided by the state.1 8 1
This type of trust is sometimes referred to as a "Qualifying Income
Trust" or a "Miller Trust."1 8 This type of trust is important in a state
such as Georgia where only those individuals whose income is below a
certain amount are eligible for Medicaid.' 9 Under current Georgia
law, individuals cannot qualify for Medicaid assistance if they receive
income that exceeds the Medicaid income cap, which as of 2011 is $2022
per month.'90 The average cost of nursing home care in Georgia as of
2011 is $4916.55.11 Thus, there exists a group of individuals who are
too "rich" to qualify for Medicaid yet too "poor" to afford to live in a
nursing home. Under federal law, these individuals may set up a
Qualifying Income Trust. 19 2 Many of the individuals for whom such
trusts become appropriate have already receded to such a low level of
capacity that they no longer have the capacity to set up a trust. 93
These individuals also often have powers of attorney that were signed
prior to the 2010 amendment, which requires that the power of attorney
contain express authorization for the agent to set up a trust for the
principal.194 Thus, prior to the 2011 amendment, to set up a trust for

185. Id. § 53-12-20 (2011).
186. See id. § 53-12-20(d).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
188. The Colorado case that first recognized the use of these trusts to make the settlor
eligible for Medicaid was Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990). Congress
codified the use of these trusts in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(dX4) (2006)).
189. Medicaid ABCs, GEORGIA.GOV, http://dch.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,31446711
31944826_165785703,00.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2011) ("Medicaid is a medical
assistance program that helps many people who can't afford medical care pay for some or
all of their medical bills.").
190. Eligibility CriteriaChart, GEORGIA.GOV, http://dch.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,
31446711_31945377 31944881,00.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
191. Key Medicaid Information for Georgia 2011, ELDERLAwANSWERS.COM, http:/
www.elderlawanswers.com/Resources/Article.asp?scope=GA&key=keym (last visited Aug.
25, 2011).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(dX4).
193. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-23 (2011) describes the capacity necessary to establish a trust.
194. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20(a).
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such individuals it was necessary to appoint a conservator for those
individuals, a procedure which could be costly and time-consuming."
The exception that was added by the 2011 amendment now allows the
agents of such individuals to set up a Miller Trust even if the power of
attorney does not contain express authorization for an agent to establish
a trust on behalf of the principal."e'

195. For a discussion of conservatorships for incapacitated adults, see RADFORD, supra
note 119, ch. 5.
196. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20(d).

